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4.1  Introduction 
In this chapter I take up three policy issues that have been of central 
concern in  recent  academic and official discussions of international 
economic interdependence and macroeconomic policy coordination. 
They are: 
1. What should be the monetary and/or fiscal response in the rest of 
the industrialized world to a unilateral tightening of U.S. fiscal policy, 
and what should be the U.S. monetary response to that? 
2.  What should be the monetary and fiscal response in  the indus- 
trialized countries to a sudden, large change in an important exchange 
rate? For concreteness I shall refer to this event as a “collapse of the 
U.S. dollar.” 
3. What should be the policy response in the industrialized world to 
a disappointing real-growth performance? 
All three issues are clearly of more than academic interest. In this 
chapter I attempt to give qualitative answers using a simple analytical 
model.  However simple the individual-country  models  may  be, the 
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interdependent global economic system very soon grows too large for 
analytical treatment; numerical simulation methods are called for. Re- 
cent work by  Sachs (1985) and by  Sachs and McKibbin  (1985) has 
demonstrated the usefulness of  such an approach. The advantages in 
terms of intuition and insight from keeping things sufficiently small and 
transparent to permit a simple algebraic and diagrammatic analysis are 
such, however, that a first pass at this problem “in two dimensions” 
is justified. 
Section 4.2.1 outlines the simple two-country Dornbusch-style model 
that  has  a floating exchange rate,  perfect  capital mobility, rational 
exchange-rate expectations, and gradual price adjustment. The long- 
run or steady-state comparative statics are reviewed in section 4.2.2 
while section 4.2.3 characterizes the nature of the dynamic adjustment 
process.  Possible responses to a tightening of  U.S.  fiscal policy are 
reviewed in section 4.3. In section 4.4 possible responses to a collapse 
of the U.S. dollar are considered and section 4.5 deals with the policy 
implications of a slowdown in world economic activity. Qualifications 
and conclusions are found in section 4.6. 
4.2  An Analytical Approach 
4.2.1  The Model 
Consider the simple two-country or two-region version of the Dorn- 
busch (1976) open macroeconomic model with a free-floating exchange 
rate and perfect capital mobility given in equations (lt(12)  below. This 
model can be viewed as a sluggish-price-adjustment ,  rational-exchange- 
rate-expectations version  of  Mundell’s two-country model (Mundell 
[1968]). Except for some inconsequential differences, this model is the 
one used by Miller (1982). Turnovsky (1985) has used  this model to 
analyze the effects of  a number of anticipated and unanticipated mon- 
etary and fiscal shocks. (See also Buiter [1985a] for another applica- 
tion.) All variables other than interest rates are in natural logarithms. 
All coefficients are non-negative.  Country  1 will be referred to as 
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In these equations mj  is the nominal money stock of countryj, pj its 
gross domestic product (GDP) deflator, yj its real output, ij its nominal 
interest rate, and rj its real interest rate; e is the nominal exchange rate, 
expressed as the number of units of country  1’s currency per unit of 
country 2’s  currency;  is a measure of fiscal stance in country j,  T~  is 
country j’s tax rate on interest income accruing from abroad and its 
subsidy rate on the interest cost of borrowing from abroad. These taxes 
drive a wedge between the domestic nominal-interest rate and the in- 
terest rate on loans denominated in the same currency overseas. The 
real exchange rate or competitiveness is c, and lj is country j’s stock 
of real-money balances. 
The model has rational exchange-rate expectations and rational in- 
flation expectations by investors. The exchange rate is set in  an effi- 
cient, forward-looking asset market. It can make discrete “jumps”  at 
a point in time in response to “news.”  Domestic costs pi are prede- 
termined (i.e., given at a point in time), but their rates of change respond 
to excess demand or supply and “core inflation.” 
The model will have short-run Keynesian but long-run classical or 
monetarist features. Each country’s demand for real-money balances 
varies positively with its own national income yj and negatively with 
its own nominal interest rate ij.’ There is no endogenous direct currency 
substitution.2  A shift parameter 5  is added to allow for portfolio shifts. 
The demand for each country’s output depends on its real interest rate 
rj, on competitiveness c, on the other country’s level of real income, 
and on the domestic fiscal impulse&. Domestic costs are governed by 
an augmented Phillips curve. The (logarithm of the) level of capacity 
output yj (or the  natural rate of  unemployment) in  each country  is 
exogenous. The augmentation term in the Phillips curve is taken to be 
the current rate of growth of the money stock mj.  This is done merely 
to permit a simple diagrammatic analysis of the model’s properties. 
More  satisfactory ways of modeling the augmentation term are dis- 
cussed in Buiter and Miller (1982, 1983, 1985). 
The two countries are not only linked through competitiveness and 
activity effects  but also directly through  an integrated international 
financial market. Equation (5) represents the condition for (after-tax) 
uncovered  interest  parity.  U.S.  and  ROW  currency-denominated 
y2 =  -y2r2  - 
P2 = *2(Y2  -  72) + h2 
+ p2 -  PI)  + ~IYI  +h 
r2 = i2 -  p2 
lI = ml  -  pI 
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interest-bearing assets are perfect substitutes in private portfolios. This 
will  be the case if  the international financial markets are efficient and 
if there are risk-neutral speculators. 
It  will  be  convenient to represent  the essential  dynamics of  this 
economic miniworld through three state variables, b,j= I ,2; real-money 
balances in each of the two countries; and c, U.S. competitiveness. 
4.2.2.  The Long-Run Equilibrium 
The long-run comparative statics in this model are completely clas- 
sical or monetarist. Output in each country is at its exogenously given 
full employment level, and changes in the levels and growth rates of 
nominal money stocks are translated into corresponding changes in the 
levels and proportional rates of change of costs and of  the exchange 
rate.  Equation  (13a-i)  summarizes the long-run equilibrium  of  this 
economy. 
(1  3a)  Yi  = Yi  i=  1,2 
(13b)  p; = m;  i=  1,2 
(13c)  p  =mi-  m2 
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where 
(13J)  A  = 821%  + 812Y2. 
In the long run (at full employment), fiscal expansion in the United 
States worsens U.S. competitiveness while fiscal expansion in the ROW 
causes U.S. competitiveness to im~rove.~  Neither changes in the levels 
nor in  the rates of growth of  the nominal money  stocks affect real 
competitiveness or real interest rates. Fiscal expansion in the United 
States or in the ROW raises the world real interest rate. (Note that the 
United States and the ROW real interest rates differ only to the extent 
that U.S. and ROW taxes [subsidies] on foreign interest income [pay- 
ments] differ.) An increase in T~ -  T~ lowers the U.S. real interest rate 
and  raises that in the ROW.  Competitiveness therefore must  move 
against the United States to restore equilibrium in the market for U.S. 
output. An  increase in  mi  raises pi  and the rate of  depreciation of 
country  i's  currency by the same amount. A higher nominal interest 
rate reduces the stock of  real-money balances demanded in the long 
run, if  the interest-sensitivity  of the demand for real-money balances 
is nonzero.  Given  the rate  of  money  growth (and thus the rate  of 
inflation), expansionary fiscal policy in  either country, by raising the 
real interest rate, also raises the nominal interest rate and reduces the 
demand for real-money balances at home and abroad. 
An increase in the level of capacity output (Ti)  of a country is as- 
sociated with an improvement in its long-run competitiveness. This is 
required in order for the market to absorb the relatively greater supply 
of that country's output. If we assume that 812~21  - ljI2  and a2,e12  -  812 
are both negative, an increase in the level of capacity output in either 
country lowers the long-run real interest rate in both countries; the 
lower real interest rates stimulate demand and bring it back to equality 
with the larger level of full employment output. Both directly, via the 
income effect on money demand and indirectly, by lowering the nominal 
interest rate (since real interest rates decline and money growth is held 
constant), increased capacity output in either country raises the long- 
run stock of  real-money balances in both countries. 
4.2.3.  The Dynamic Response to Policy Changes 
and Exogenous Shocks 
The three simultaneous state equations of the unrestricted model are 
available from the author on request. When the restriction is imposed 
that the two countries or regions have identical structures, it becomes 
possible to provide an analytical and diagrammatic exposition of the 
main policy issues (see Aoki [1981] and Miller [1982]). The assumption 
of identical structures is of course quite restrictive. All differences in 
country performance must  be attributed  solely to different policies, 
different exogenous shocks, or different initial conditions. A full anal- 126  Willem H. Buiter 
ysis of two- or three-country models that allows for intercountry dif- 
ferences in the specification of  major behavioral relationships will re- 
quire numerical simulation methods. The simplified two-country model 
does, however, permit a very transparent first pass at the major policy 
issues. Symmetry in this model means that kl = k2 = k;  Al = A2  =  A; 
The three simultaneous state equations of the unrestricted model can 
be decomposed into two independent subsystems when the restriction 
of identical structures is imposed. A two-dimensional system involves 
the real exchange rate and the difference between the two countries' 
J"  =.fi -  f2,  T~ =  T~ -  T~,  and Ld = LI -  L2. 
(14a)  [  !]  = [all  a21  '121  a22  [I"] + [ 
yI = y2  = y;  612 = 621  = 6;  €12  = €21  = €;  $1  = $2  = *. 
real  money stocks. Let Id = 1, -  12, rizd = rizl - rizl; qd =  111 -  112, 
bll  b12  b13  b14 b15 
b2l b22  623 b24  b25 1 
R = I  + ?r, 
r = y-lk - *. 
A  one-dimensional  system  involves  only  averages  or  global 
magnitudes. 
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The "output equations," the equations giving the short-run endog- 
enous variables as functions of the state variables and the exogenous 
variables are (using self-explanatory notation): 
(15a)  -A-'(l  -  yJI + E)(R + 
2(R  + €)-I8  ]  [Y] 
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and 128  Willem H. Buiter 
The long-run comparative statics for the differences and averages 
can be obtained easily from equations (1 3a-i): 
(16a)  Id  =  -Ahd  + qd  +  AT^  + ed 
Ul - €1  -  )  Y“? 
A 
Y  Y 
(16d)  I*  =  -Ah“  + q* - -p  +  (k  + 
Global or average economic performance and the difference between 
the economic performances of the two countries are “decoupled”: they 
can be studied independently of each other, with average outcomes a 
function only of current and past average policy instrument values and 
average exogenous shocks, while performance differences are a func- 
tion only of differences in current, past, and expected future differences 
in policy instrument values and exogenous disturbances. The “aver- 
ages”  rnodel-equations (14b) and (lSb)-can indeed be viewed as a 
self-contained model of a single closed economy.  Because the price 
deflators are predetermined and the real exchange rate “washes out” 
through the assumption of symmetrical structures, the “averages” model 
contains no nonpredetermined, forward-looking or jump variables. Note 
that after analyzing averages and differences, we can easily retrieve 
individual country performance, since Il = 1/2  Id  + P,  I,  = -  1/2  Id  + 
l‘,  etc. 
The “averages”  economy (equation  14b) with its single predeter- 
mined  state  variable  will  be  stable  if  and  only  if 
-+A-l(fl  - 
(17a)  fl>E 
< 0 that is i.f.f. 
The “differences” system (equation 14a) with its predetermined vari- 
able Id and its nonpredetermined variable c, will have a unique con- 
vergent  saddlepoint equilibrium if  and only if all  azz - azl  a12 < 0 
that is i.f.f. 
(  17b)  fl> -€ 
Since E > 0, (17a) implies (17b). 
Equation (17b) is equivalent to the condition that an improvement 
in  U.S. competitiveness will  (given Id, md, qd,  fd, and rf)  raise  the 
effective demand for U.S.  output relative to output in the rest of the 129  Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World Economy 
world.  It is a weak condition,  which amounts to assuming that in a 
diagram with the nominal interest rate on the vertical axis and output 
on the horizontal axis, the IS curve (after using the Phillips curve to 
substitute out the [expected] rate of  inflation) is either downward-slop- 
ing or upward-sloping and steeper than the LM curve. I assume that 
(17a) is satisfied. Given (17a) (and thereby [17bJ), the saddlepoint equi- 
librium and the “differences”  system either look like figure 4. la  (when 
the IS curve is downward  sloping,  u22 > 0 3/ and the C=O locus is 
upward-sloping) or like figure 4.  I b (when the IS curve  is upward-sloping 
and steeper than the LM curve, u22 < 0 and the C  = 0 locus is down- 
ward-sloping  and cuts the ld=O  locus from above). Since the phase 
diagram is qualitatively similar in  the two cases, I shall restrict the 
analysis to the case depicted  in figure 4.la.  Figure 4.lc depicts the 
c 
Fig. 4.1  Equilibrium and dynamic adjustment in the symmetric two- 
country model. WO  Willem H. Buiter 
adjustment process of the single predetermined state variable for the 
“averages”  system. 
First among the policy issues to be considered now is the proper 
response in the ROW to a unilateral U.S. fiscal contraction. 
4.3  Responses to a Tightening of U.S. Fiscal Policy 
4.3.1  U.S. Fiscal Tightening without Fiscal or Monetary Response 
in the ROW and without Monetary Response in the U.S.A. 
A fiscal tightening in the United States without any fiscal response 
in the ROW is, in the notation of this paper, a reduction in the average 
fiscal impulse (P) and a reduction in the difference between the two 
countries’ fiscal impulsesfd which is twice as large as the reduction in 
f”. From equations 16(a-e) it is clear that the long-run consequences 
of  this unilateral fiscal contraction  will  be  the following: (1)  an im- 
provement in U.S. competitiveness (c increases); (2) a lowering of the 
real interest rate in the United States and in the rest of the world; (3) 
an increase in the world real-money stock because nominal as well as 
real interest rates are lower in the United States and in the R.O.W. 
In figure 4.2a we see that for c and Id,  the full long-run adjustment 
from E,  to E2 occurs instantaneously. Relative U.S.-ROW real-money 
balances are unaffected by the U.S. fiscal tightening. The required long- 
run depreciation in  the real exchange rate can therefore be brought 
about immediately by a “jump”  or step depreciation in the nominal 
exchange rate of the United States. 
In the new long-run equilibrium, the global stock of real-money bal- 
ances will be larger since lower nominal interest rates raise velocity. 
Given nominal money growth rates in the United States and the ROW 
and without any discrete changes in the levels of the nominal money 
stocks, the process of increasing real balances requires that the rate 
of inflation be  held  below the given rates of  growth of the nominal 
money stocks. There will therefore be a temporary global recession: 
ya declines. The global recession affects the United  States and the 
R.O.W.  equally: yd is zero throughout the adjustment process.  U.S. 
output declines because of the fiscal tightening but the decline is mit- 
igated as competitiveness improves. The ROW suffers from its loss of 
competitiveness, which mirrors the improvement in the U.S. compet- 
itiveness. The recession  is therefore concentrated in  the nontraded 
goods sector of the United States and the traded goods sector of the 
ROW. Nominal and real interest rates and inflation rates in the United 
States and the ROW are affected equally by U.S.  fiscal contraction: 
id,  rd,  and bd  are zero throughout. Both nominal and real interest rates 
decline globally (and in each country). As in the familiar closed econ- 131  Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World Economy 
ia 
Fig. 4.2 
omy IS-LM, augmented Phillips curve model, the decline in nominal 
and real interest rates mitigates the contraction of aggregate demand 
but does not undo it completely. There is “crowding out” (in our policy 
experiment a reversal of crowding out) but less than 100%. Note that 
because inflation declines during the recession, real interest rates come 
down by less than nominal interest rates. Figure 4.3 summarizes the 
response to the unexpected announcement at time to of an immediately 
implemented permanent tightening of U.S. fiscal p01icy.~ 
4.3.2  Monetary Policy Stabilizes the Nominal Exchange Rate 
One alternative scenario often considered consists of a tightening of 
U.S. fiscal policy, unaccommodating U.S. monetary policy, unchanged 
fiscal policy in the ROW,  and monetary policy in the ROW geared to 
interest rate coupling. Given perfect international capital mobility, in- 132  Willem H.  Buiter 
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Fig. 4.3  GIobal and regional response to a unilateral tightening of U.S. 
fiscal policy. 
terest rate coupling amounts to having a fixed nominal exchange rate. 
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, a fiscal contraction in the United 
States will, with perfect capital mobility, lead to a stock-shift outflow 
of  capital from the United States, a stock-shift loss of  U.S. foreign 
exchange reserves, and a corresponding contraction in the U.S. money 
stock. The ROW  experiences the counterpart stock-shift  inflow of cap- 
ital, stock-shift gain in foreign exchange reserves, and expansion of its 133  Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World Economy 
money stock. It is therefore arbitrary whether one assigns the stabi- 
lization of  the exchange rate to the monetary policy of the ROW or to 
the United States. Under a fixed exchange rate regime (which is expected 
to be  permanent),  there  is effectively  a single global world money 
market or world LM schedule. Individual countries can choose their 
own rates of domestic credit expansion and thus collectively determine 
the growth of the world money stock. The distribution of this world 
money stock across countries is determined by the individual countries’ 
money demand functions, with reserve flows making up the difference 
between  changes  in  domestic  money  demand  and  domestic  credit 
expansion. 
The formal analysis of the fixed exchange rate regime is very simple. 
Let the global stock of gold and foreign exchange reserves be constant 
and, for notational simplicity, equal to zero. The global money stock 
is therefore the sum of the two countries’ stocks of  domestic credit. 
Let  rn be  the logarithm of the global nominal money  stock, Di  the 
logarithm of country i’s stock of domestic credit, and u the share of 
U.S. domestic credit in total domestic credit. 
(1 84 
Setting the logarithm of the fixed nominal exchange rate equal to zero, 
we define the global price level, p, as follows: 
(18b)  p = up, + (1 - u)p2. 
The global money demand shock q is similarly defined as: 
(18c)  q = vql  + (1 -  u)qz. 
and global income as 
(19)  Y  = VY, + (1 -  4Y2. 
The proportional rate of growth of country i’s domestic credit is p,, = di. 
(Under a free-floating exchange rate regime,  pj = hi.)  The augmen- 
tation term in the Phillips curve is taken to be the policy-determined 
ki  rather than the endogenously determined mj.  No fixed exchange rate 
regime is  viable unless  inflation rates converge. I therefore  impose 
pl = p2 = p,.  This still permits short-term divergence of inflation rates. 
I also define i =  i, = i2 + 72 -  T~.  The model consists of equations 
(20)-(23) and (2), (4),  (7) and (9). Identical structures are again assumed. 
(20) 
m = VD,  + (1 - v)D2  0 < u < 1. 
1  = ky - hi  + q -  (1 -  u)h(~,  -  72) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23)  1  =rn-p 
PI  = MY, -  YI)  + P 
P2 = MY2 -  72) + P W  Willem H.  Buiter 
For algebraic simplicity and in order to retain comparability with the 
floating exchange rate case, both countries are assumed to be of equal 
size, so Y = Y2. 
The fixed exchange rate version  has two state variables,  I  and c, 
which are both predetermined. The equations of  motion and the de- 
termination of  output in the two countries are given in equations (24) 
and (25) respectively. 
I[:] 
0 
0  -2+(K, -  K2)-'6 l35  Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World Economy 
KI = 1 + y(fkhl - +) 
Several points can be made about the fixed exchange rate system. 
First, stability requires that K, + K2 > 0 and that KI - Kz > 0. This 
is equivalent to requiring that Kl > 0 and A > 0. Hoever, K2 could be 
either positive or negative. With a fixed exchange rate, fiscal contrac- 
tion in the United States will therefore definitely lower U.S. real output- 
from (25)-  = KIA-' > 0-but  it may either raise or lower real output 
in the ROW--  =  -K2A-I.  If K2 < 0, the depressing effect on the 
ROW'S export sector of  a decline in U.S. demand outweighs the ben- 
eficial effect of lower worldwide interest rates-  > !h  ykX-' in (26b)- 
and the ROW  experiences a slump.  If  the  "crowding  in"  effect  is 
stronger than the direct demand effect, K2 > 0, then the ROW expands 
while the United  States contracts. Even if  output in both countries 
declines, the decline will be steeper in the United States. 
It is easily checked that, if  the United States and the ROW are of 
similar size, total world output always contracts, even in the case where 
output in the ROW is stimulated by lower interest rates: 
(27) 
aY  1 




yo =(K,  + K2)-lyh-l -  2 
+ (K, + K2)-lyp - (K, + K&lyh-lq 
+ (K, +  - (K, + K2)-lyI)7". 
Note that average global real liquidity under the fixed exchange rate 
regime--1/2  1 given in equation (24rbehaves identically to average 
global real liquidity under the freely floating exchange rate regime-f' 
given in equation (14b).5 The same holds for average world output- 
compare equation (27) with y'  from equation (15b). That the long-run, 
steady-state effects of fiscal policy (or other real shocks) are the same 
under fixed and floating rates is also easy to check. 
When therefore we compare the consequences of  a tightening of 
U.S. fiscal policy under a floating exchange rate with that under a fixed 
exchange rate, holding global monetary policy constant in  the sense 
that the growth rates of domestic credit (and therefore the growth rate 136  Willem H. Buiter 
of the global stock of nominal money) are the same in the two regimes, 
the recession in the United States following the fiscal contraction will 
be smaller under a floating exchange rate while in the ROW the reces- 
sion will be deeper with a floating rate. 
The global loss of  output is the same under the two exchange rate 
regimes, but while under a floating rate the recessions in the U.S. and 
the ROW are identical in magnitude (although in the United States the 
nontraded goods  sector will  be hit while in the ROW  it will be the 
traded goods sector), under a fixed rate the United States will always 
experience a deeper recession. It is even possible that under a fixed 
rate the ROW would experience a net boost to output. 
The short-run behavior of  the real exchange rate is quite different 
under the two regimes, As shown in figure 4.3, under a floating ex- 
change rate U.S. competitiveness, which is a nonpredetermined vari- 
able in this case, sharply improves on impact to its new equilibrium 
level. This jump-depreciation of c reflects a jump-depreciation of e, the 
nominal exchange rate. While this clearly represents a hard landing for 
the U.S. dollar, it represents a much softer landing for the U.S. real 
economy than the alternative scenario in which the nominal exchange 
rate is kept constant throughout. In the latter case U.S. competitiveness 
improves gradually  after the  U.S.  fiscal contraction  and  converges 
asymptotically to the same level achieved immediately with a freely 
floating exchange rate. The improvement in competitiveness is due to 
the U.S. rate of  cost inflation falling below that in the ROW because 
of the relatively deeper recession in the U.S. 
An alternative fixed nominal exchange rate  scenario that is some- 
times considered more likely is the following, which can be called the 
“non-McKinnon variant.” The United States, instead of accepting the 
stock-shift contraction in its domestic money stock associated with the 
stock-shift outflow of capital and loss of reserves, engages in domestic 
open market purchases to maintain the initial level of the money stock, 
i.e., it sterilizes the stock-shift loss of reserves by a stock-shift expan- 
sion of domestic credit. The ROW does not sterilize. This means that 
the global money stock expands (through a stock-shift U.S.  domestic 
credit expansion) until the now endogenously determined U.S.  money 
stock again assumes its pre-fiscal  contraction value. 
In contrast with the first analysis of  the fixed exchange rate case, 
there now is a once-off increase in the level of the global nominal money 
stock path (relative to what happens under a floating rate) accompa- 
nying the U.S. fiscal contraction. Global nominal and real interest rates 
will decline by more than they do both in the fixed exchange rate case 
without U.S. sterilization and in the floating exchange rate case. It is 
clear that the recession in  the United  States will  be  less deep with 
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less deep or the expansion larger. It is easily checked that with a fixed 
exchange rate and sterilization in the United States, the impact effects 
of  a fiscal change in the United States on output in the United States 
and in the ROW is given by: 
(28a)  -  - 
and 
aY1 -  1 - r* 
aft  (1 -  + ykA-’)(l -  y+)  + E(ykA-’ -  E)’ 
E - ykk’ 
(1 - y+ + ykA-’)(l  - y$)  + E(ykA-’ -  E)’ 
-  aY2  (28b)  -  - 
Assuming that the IS curve is downward-sloping (1 -  y+ > 0) and 
that the denominators of (28a, b) are positive, U.S. output declines on 
impact, while the ROW has a recession if the direct activity spillover 
effects dominate the “crowding in” effects of lower interest rates (E - 
ykh-’ > 0),  a boom if  the reverse holds true. 
Global economic activity (assuming the United States and the ROW 
to be of equal size) can either contract (if 1 - y+ -  ykh-’ + E > 0) 
or expand (if 1 - y+ - ykh-1  +  E < 0). This ambiguity is to be ex- 
pected  since, globally, monetary and fiscal policy move in  opposite 
directions. Strong crowding out (high y and low A) increases the like- 
lihood of a net expansionary effect. 
4.3.3  Policies That Achieve an Improvement in U.S. 
Competitiveness without a Contraction of World Demand 
In this subsection I take as given the fiscal tightening in the United 
States as well as the achievement of a lasting improvement  in  U.S. 
external competitiveness. A floating exchange rate is again assumed. 
A ROW Fiscal Expansion  to Match the US.  Fiscal  Contraction 
In the formal setting of our little model, the transition to improved 
U.S. competitiveness can be achieved instantaneously and without any 
contraction of effective demand at home or abroad by having the U.S. 
fiscal contraction matched by a corresponding ROW fiscal expansion. 
In  terms of  the dynamics of  equations (14a,b) and (15a,b) and the 
steady-state conditions of equations (16a-e), this “package”  consists 
of a reduction in fd with fa unchanged. Figure 4.4 shows the instanta- 
neous adjustment process. 
There is no change in real or nominal interest rates as the effects on 
the global capital market of the two opposing fiscal impulses cancel 
each other out. For a given U.S. fiscal contraction, the improvement 
in U.S. competitiveness is now doubled (in our linear model) because 
of the fiscal expansion in the RQW.  World aggregate demand is un- 
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Fig. 4.4  Response to a U.S. fiscal contraction and a matching ROW 
fiscal expansion. 
There are several qualifications to be made before this painless ad- 
justment package is recommended for use in the real world. First, while 
total output stays constant in each country, there is a shift toward the 
production of tradeables in the United States and toward the production 
of nontradeables in  the ROW.  Steelworkers make poor hairdressers 
and conversely. The problems associated with changing the sectoral 
composition of production, employment, and investment are ignored 
in our simple model. 
Second, the selection of  dosage and timing for the ROW fiscal ex- 
pansion is made to look simpler than it is in practice because of the 
assumption of known, identical structures. While this in no way weak- 
ens the case for a flexible policy response in principle, it makes the 
practical task of selecting the right mix, dose, and timing a much more 
complicated matter than our simple model may suggest. 
Third, a fiscal expansion in the ROW may be opposed for structural 
or allocative reasons. Increased public spending may be undesirable 
because of its political irreversibility and because, at full employment, 
the benefits from the spending are  judged to be less than its cost. Lower 
taxes or higher transfer payments may be undesirable because of pos- 
sible efficiency losses, undesirable  incentive effects, or for distribu- 
tional reasons. 
Fourth, fiscal expansions (other than balanced-budget fiscal expan- 
sions) entail larger deficits and, in time, a larger public debt. If the real 
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debt-deficit spirals are possible unless the primary (noninterest) deficit 
is planned (and believed) to become a surplus in due course. If there 
is no reputation for fiscal rectitude, temporary (increases in) deficits 
will be extrapolated into the future. Fear of possible future monetization 
of deficits will raise long nominal interest rates. Increased uncertainty 
about the future course of inflation may add a further risk premium to 
the required rate of return on nominal government debt. In extreme 
circumstances, fear of partial or complete debt repudiation or of special 
capital levies and surcharges may build a risk premium into the rate 
of return on all public debt (see Blanchard and Layard eds., Dornbusch 
[1986] and Buiter  [1985b]). A good  reputation  for underlying  fiscal 
rectitude would, however, avoid the potential crowding-out resulting 
from such conjidence effects. It might therefore help if such a program 
were supervised by or at least coordinated through an international 
organization or institution that has a reputation for fiscal restraint. 
Finally, it may be judged that the global level of effective demand is 
currently excessive, and that a net deduction in global demand is in 
order, as well as a realignment of U.S.  competitiveness. A unilateral 
U.S. fiscal contraction might in that case be the right policy. The point 
would seem to be mainly of academic interest if, as many observers 
argue, there remains a margin of Keynesian slack in the world economy. 
A US.  Fiscal Contraction Matched by Effective  Demand-Maintaining 
Expansionary Monetary Policy Changes 
Calls for a change in the U.S. macroeconomic policy mix, from tight 
money and loose fiscal policy to looser money and tighter fiscal policy, 
have been  heard from all corners of the profession  in recent years. 
There are two kinds of monetary policy changes that could be used in 
the present model: changes in level of the nominal money stock and 
changes in the proportional growth rate of the nominal money stock. 
Money-jumps. It is clear from inspection of the steady-state conditions 
(16a,e) and the equations of motion (14a,b) and (15a,b) that there is 
only one set of discrete (discontinuous) changes in the levels of  the 
nominal money stocks in both countries that will permit an instanta- 
neous transition at full employment (in both countries) to the new real 
long-run equilibrium associated with the unilateral reduction in the U.S. 
fiscal impulse discussed in  section 4.3.1.  If df, < 0 is the size of the 
U.S. fiscal contraction, these nominal money-jumps in both countries 
are given by 
dm, = dm2 = - 
A 
-  dfi 
2Y 
At the predetermined price level, this nominal money-jump provides 
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the lower nominal (and real) world interest rate associated with the 
lower global fiscal impulse. There is no need to force the price level 
path below the nominal money stock path through a policy of demand 
deflation and unemployment. The steady-state increase in real-money 
balances,  which in a new-classical model with a nonpredetermined, 
flexible price level would be brought about by a discrete downward 
jump in the price level path, is achieved in the Keynesian, predeter- 
mined price-level model by a stock-shift open market purchase in each 
country  that  increases  the  nominal  money  stocks by  the  required 
amounts. It is the stickiness of real money balances which makes a 
recession inevitable when there is any exogenous shock or policy change 
that raises the long-run demand for money balances. This stickiness 
of the real money stock reflects both the stickiness of domestic costs 
(assumed to be a policy and exogenous shock-invariant structural prop- 
erty of private market behavior) and the stickiness of monetary policy. 
If  the level of the nominal money  stock is a choice variable  at any 
given instant, policy flexibility can make up for and compensate for 
domestic cost inflexibility. 
The great advantage of the kind of once-and-for-all nominal money- 
stock jumps considered here is that they don’t result in any change in 
the rate of inflation in the short run or in the long run. They do cause 
the long-run level of  the path  of  prices to be higher than it would 
otherwise have been, but since welfare costs are associated with the 
rate of inflation rather than with the level of prices,6 this is no cause 
for concern. The major problem with money-jump policies is their effect 
on inflationary expectations.  The obvious analytical distinction be- 
tween a discontinuous discrete change in the level of the money stock 
path and a (finite) change in  the instantaneous rate of change of that 
path may not be as obvious in practice, especially when the money 
stock is sampled at discrete time intervals: a once-and-for-all upward 
level change at a point in time in the middle of an observation interval 
to may look much like an increase in the rate of growth between to and 
to + 1. If such an apparent increase in the growth rate is extrapolated 
into the future, serious instability may result. Governments or central 
banks with a reputation for monetary rectitude will be able to engineer 
once-off money-jumps without adverse effects on inflationary expec- 
tations. Governments or central banks with a reputation for monetary 
laxness will be prisoners of the markets’ lack of confidence and may 
have to live with the adverse effects on inflation expectations of any 
observed increase in the money stock. 
Note that if  the monetary authorities had nominal income targets 
rather than monetary targets, there should be no credibility problems 
associated with a once-off increase in the nominal money stock. Nom- 
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desirable operating characteristics whenever exogenous shocks or pol- 
icy changes necessitate a change in velocity. 
Changes in money growth rates. The other monetary policy action (in 
both countries) that can achieve the transition to an improved level of 
U.S. competitiveness without  any output or employment  cost is an 
equal permanent increase in the rate of growth of the nominal money 
stock in each country. It can again be checked from the steady-state 
conditions (16a-e) and from the equations of motion (14a,b) and (15a,b) 
that the following permanent increase in  m, and m2 will achieve an 
instantaneous transition at full employment (in both countries) to the 
new real long-run equilibrium associated with the unilateral reduction 
in the U.S. fiscal impulse discussed in  section 4.3.1. 
This monetary policy response would, by raising the rate of inflation 
in both countries, prevent the global real interest rate decline resulting 
from the U.S. fiscal contraction from being translated into a decline in 
nominal interest rates. With nominal interest rates unchanged, there 
is no increase in the demand for real-money balances and consequently 
no need for a recession to depress the general price level path below 
the nominal money stock path. The policy has one obvious undesirable 
feature: a recession is prevented at the cost of  having a permanently 
higher rate of inflation in the world economy. 
4.4  Responses to a Collapse of the U.S.  Dollar 
A second question addressed by economic policymakers and analysts 
is the proper response (in the U.S. and in the ROW) to a sudden large 
fall in the value of a key currency, taken here, for concreteness, to be 
the  U.S.  dollar. To  determine the nature of  the  appropriate  policy 
responses, we  first must  determine what  the causes of  the  sudden 
depreciation of the currency are. There are two broad classes of pos- 
sible causes: (a) the bursting of a speculative bubble that caused the 
dollar to be overvalued in relation to the “fundamentals”;  (b) an actual 
or perceived change in the fundamentals driving the exchange rate. 
The latter category can be subdivided into a number of cases: (1) A 
portfolio shift against the dollar that reflects, say, greater uncertainty 
about the future prospects for U.S. inflation. In the simple model used 
here, this can be represented by a reduction in U.S.  liquidity prefer- 
ence-a  fall in q,.  (2) An increase in the real risk premium on foreign- 
owned U.S. assets. This could reflect fear of future increases in taxation 
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repudiation  or default.  In the model this can be  represented  by  an 
increase in  ~~-.r,-the real  risk  premium is like a net  tax on U.S. 
interest income. (3) An unexpected increase in the level of  the U.S. 
money stock or in the rate of U.S. monetary growth. (4) An unexpected 
tightening of the U.S. fiscal stance. 
All  four events should  be  thought of  in  relative terms,  e.g.,  the 
portfolio shift against the dollar reflects an increase in uncertainty about 
U.S. inflation relative to uncertainty about inflation in the rest of the 
world. Similarly, it is looser U.S. monetary policy relative to monetary 
policy elsewhere or tighter U.S. fiscal policy relative to fiscal policy 
elsewhere that puts downward pressure on the dollar. 
An important issue in  determining the appropriate policy response 
to a sudden drop of the dollar in response to a change in private sector 
perceptions concerning the likely future course of the fundamentals, 
is whether the national authorities and the international coordinating 
agency share these new perceptions. A different approach will in gen- 
eral be called for if  the authorities believe they have information su- 
perior to that used by private agents in forming expectations, but there 
is no way of sharing this information with private market participants 
or of convincing them of its relevance. In what follows, no superior 
public sector information is assumed. 
4.4.1  A Bursting Bubble 
It is well known that the solution of rational  expectations models 
with forward-looking, nonpredetermined state variables (such as the 
nominal and the real exchange rate in our model) may be characterized 
by a bubble; that is, the behavior of the endogenous variables may be 
influenced by  variables that matter only because, somehow, private 
agents believe that they matter. These bubble processes, which affect 
expectations in a self-validating manner, may be functions of the fun- 
damental variables (i.e., those variables that enter into the structure 
of the model other than by merely being part of the information set 
used to form expectations) or of completely extraneous or spurious 
variables of the “sunspot” variety (Blanchard [1979]; Azariadis [1981], 
Obstfeld and Rogoff [1983]). In figure 4.5, it is assumed that all “fun- 
damentals” have constant values, now and in the future, that the steady- 
state equilibrium corresponding to these constant values for the fun- 
damentals is E,, and that the associated convergent saddle path is SOSO. 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the predetermined variable is 
at its steady-state value 1 $.  The nonpredetermined variable c, however, 
is on a bubble path EE which overvalues it relative to the path warranted 
by the fundamentals (SOSO).  Its value at to, the time when the bubble 
bursts, is co.  The bursting of the bubble moves c instantaneously to its 
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Fig. 4.5  The end of an exchange rate bubble. 
about the direction of the discrete jump in the exchange rate at to. The 
instantaneous discrete upward jump in c and e would, if it were antic- 
ipated with certainty, promise an infinite rate of return to shorting the 
dollar the instant before to. There could, however, be a set of beliefs 
that at to attaches some probability no  to a return to the fundamental 
value (Ac  = C* -  co) and some probability 1 - no  to a further discrete 
downward jump in c to cl,  which puts the exchange rate on a bubble 
path  even  further  removed  from  its  fundamental  value.  Provided 
IIo(c* -  co) + (1 - no)  (cl -  co) = 0, there are no expected excess 
returns from taking an open currency position.’  It seems self-evident 
that the right thing to do for policymakers when a bubble bursts is to 
sit back and enjoy the sight. While we do not have a well-developed 
theory of the welfare economics of speculative bubbles in a world with 
uncertain, limited, asymmetrically distributed (insider/outsider) infor- 
mation, there is a strong presumption that they are costly and harmful 
as well as unsustainable. It may be that the fundamental valuation to 
which the exchange rate returns when the bubble bursts itself repre- 
sents an unattractive equilibrium because the fundamentals (especially 
current and anticipated future policy) are in a mess. That, however, is 
an argument for doing something about the fundamentals, when the 
exchange rate once again reflects those fundamentals, a course that 
would have been desirable even if  there had been no bubble and no 
sudden drop in the exchange value of the dollar. 
In reality, the ending of a speculative bubble is likely to be associated 
both with major redistributions of wealth and with short-term disrup- 
tion of financial markets, commerce, and production because of bank- 
ruptcies and insolvencies. None of these adjustment costs are included 
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shown that it is better to end a bubble with a slow puncture than with 
a quick burst. A hard landing of the dollar under these circumstances 
does not preclude  a soft landing for the world  economy.  No policy 
response in the U.S. or in the ROW seems necessary. 
4.4.2  A Reduction in U.S. Liquidity Preference 
A downward shift in the U.S. liquidity preference schedule (a fall in 
-ql) has no long-run effects on competitiveness or on real or nominal 
interest rates, In the short run, the effects are as depicted in figure 4.6. 
An unexpected, immediate, permanent reduction in ql  works just like 
a once-off increase in the level of the U.S. money stock. The nominal 
and real exchange rate jump-depreciates to E,,  from Eo. After that the 
real  exchange rate gradually moves  back  to its initial level and the 
system converges to El. In  the U.S.  real  economic activity booms 
because of short-run lower nominal and real interest rates and because 
of  the improvement in competitiveness. Average world economic ac- 
tivity also rises (y" increases) because of the short-run downward pres- 
sure on nominal and real interest rates. Activity levels in the ROW 
are, however, depressed, as the loss of competitiveness outweighs the 
effect of  lower interest rates.  If  the initial equilibrium was deemed 
satisfactory, the obvious policy response to the fall in liquidity pref- 
erence is a matching once-off reduction in the level of the U.S. nominal 
money stock. This would leave all real and nominal variables  (other 
than 11) unchanged. 
If  the  shift out of  U.S.  money  represents a stock-shift  currency 
substitution and has as its counterpart a matching stock-shift increase 
in foreign money demand qz, the change in competitiveness will be 
twice as large. Average real-world activity (y",  i',  p'  and P) is un- 
changed in the short run and in the long run. The behavior of c and Id 
is like that illustrated in the top diagram of figure 4.6, but with a shift 
up and to the left of the saddle path that is twice as large. The United 
States experiences a transitional boom that is matched by a transitional 
slump in the ROW. The obvious way to neutralize this once-off currency 
substitution and  stabilize the  exchange rate is  to contract the  U.S. 
money  stock by  -Aql  and expand the ROW money  stock by  Aqz. 
Such monetary policy changes in  addition  may  well  have favorable 
effects (not formally modeled here) on the relative changes in inflation 
uncertainty that may have prompted the money demand shifts in the 
first place. 
An Increase in  the Real U.S.  Risk Premium 
An increase in the relative perceived real risk of foreign investment 
in the United States will in the long run raise the U.S. real and nominal 
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Fig. 4.6  Dollar  depreciation as  a  result  of a fall  in  U.S. liquidity 
preference. 
ing the average world rates unchanged. The increase in U.S. risk and 
reduction in ROW risk is assumed to apply only to foreign investors, 
not to domestic capital formation in either country. Figure 4.7 illustrates 
the dynamic response pattern to this shock. Global (la,  ya,  in, pa and 
P) are not affected. The U.S. economy experiences an immediate jump- 
depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate from Eo to Eel. 
Note that the real exchange rate overshoots its long-run equilibrium 
value. After the initial jump there is a gradual depreciation of the U.S. 
real exchange rate. The new long-run equilibrium at El represents a 
net  real  depreciation relative  to the initial one.  The U.S.  economy 
experiences a transitory boom which lowers its real stock of money 
balances. The ROW goes through a transitory slump which raises its 
real money balances. 
One possible policy response that exactly neutralizes this increase 
in the U.S. foreign investment risk premium is an equal increase in 
T, -  T~,  the excess of the U.S.  tax rate on interest income accruing 
from abroad over the ROW’s tax rate on interest income accruing from 
the United States. This would restore the initial equilibrium immedi- 
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Fig. 4.7  An increase in the relative perceived risk of foreign invest- 
ment in the United States. 
stock by A times the change in the risk premium and a reduction in the 
U.S. nominal  money  stock by the same magnitude,  would  instanta- 
neously achieve the same long-run change in the real equilibrium shown 
in figure 4.7, without any transitonal U.S. inflation and ROW contrac- 
tion. A permanent increase in the U.S. rate of monetary growth and 
an  equal  reduction  in  the  ROW  rate  of  monetary  growth  with 
dm, - dm2 = dmd =  -d(risk  premium) would, in  figure  4.7, move 
the economy immediately from Eo to  Eel, which would now be the new 
long-run equilibrium. 
Policy-induced Exchange Rate Collapses 
The response of the exchange rate to changes in fiscal and monetary 
policy in the United States and the ROW has already been discussed 
in section 4.3. The only point worth repeating here is that a hard landing 
for the  U.S.  dollar  need  not  represent a hard landing  for the U.S. 
economy or for the ROW. If the initial situation is one characterized 
by current and anticipated future lax U.S. fiscal policy and tight US. 
monetary policy,  these fundamentals are likely  to be reflected  in  a 
strong (an “overvalued”)  US.  real exchange rate. The first-best co- 
operative, coordinated  global policy package to change this unfavorable 
equilibrium (fiscal contraction in the United States and a once-off money 
stock increase in the United States  and in the ROW to meet the resulting 
decrease in velocity) is accompanied by a dollar “collapse.”  It may 
seem paradoxical that the restoration of confidence in the ability of the 
U.S.  to get and keep its budget under control would be accompanied 
by  a  fall  in  the U.S.  dollar,  but  such a  view  reflects  the mistaken 
identification  of the exchange rate as an index of national economic 
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4.5  Policy Responses to a Slowdown in Global Economic Activity 
The first question that needs to be answered before one can determine 
the appropriate U.S. and ROW policy responses to a global economic 
slowdown concerns the cause(s) of this slowdown. A distinction must 
be made between a slowdown resulting from an adverse supply-side 
shock (modeled in our simple model by a temporary or permanent fall 
in LI or Y2) and a demand-induced slowdown. In the case of the latter 
we can again distinguish adverse money-demand shocks (increases in 
q,  and q2) and reductions in private U.S. or ROW demand for goods 
and services (which can be represented as reductions inf, orf2). 
4.5.1  Adverse Supply-side Developments 
Permanent  reductions in  productive capacity in  the U.S.  and the 
ROW raise the long-run real interest rate everywhere and thus bring 
down demand in line with supply. Nominal interest rates will also rise 
if  money growth rates are unaffected and, both through real-income 
and interest-rate effects, the demand for real-money balances in both 
regions will decline in the long run. If productive capacity is affected 
equally in both countries (AFl = Ay2 = AY) there is no long-run change 
in ld or in  c. In this case, as shown in figure 4.8, the world economy 
io I 
Fig. 4.8  Effects of  a common permanent  decline in  productive ca- 
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undergoes a bout of  excess demand and of  inflation in excess of the 
rate of monetary growth (affecting both regions equally) which lowers 
the long-run stock of money balances. In the very short run, output 
(which is demand-determined) actually rises because higher inflation 
reduces the real interest rate (nominal interest rates rise less than one- 
for-one with the rate of inflation because the LM curve is not vertical). 
The policy response that prevents the emergence of excess demand 
and inflationary pressures during the transition to the lower levels of 
capacity output involves a contraction of demand which can be achieved 
either by fiscal or monetary means (or by a combination of the two). 
If  no long-run change in competitiveness is  desired, any fiscal con- 
traction should be equal in the two countries. Probably the simplest 
coordinated policy action that immediately achieves the new long-run 
equilibrium at El in figure 4.8 is a reduction in m,  and in m2 equal to 
If  the common capacity decline at  ro is expected to be temporary 
and to be reversed at r,, there is still no action in c -  id space (the top 
diagram in figure 4.8). The world economy experiences a bout of excess 
demand between to and tl (moving from Eol to Eo2)  and a bout of excess 
supply after r, (between Eo3 and E,,).  The same reduction in ml  and in 
m2 at ro will take the world economy (without excess demand) from Eo 
to E,  where it will stay until rl. At rl both nominal money stocks should 
be increased again by the same percentage by which they were reduced 
at to  in order to achieve a painless and instantaneous restoration of full 
equilibrium at El. 
An adverse permanent supply shock in the United States alone, say, 
would cause a long-run worsening of U.S. competitiveness (required 
to choke off global demand for U.S. output), some increase in global 
real and nominal interest rates (but less than with a common decline 
in capacity output), a decline in U.S. real-money balances, and a smaller 
decline in the ROW real-money balances. On impact, there is likely to 
be a step-appreciation of the dollar. After that the real exchange rate 
continues to appreciate gradually towards its new long-run equilibrium. 
Real interest rates in the United States will be below those in the ROW 
during the transition. A reduction in the U.S. nominal money stock by 
an amount  [k +  ]ATI, and an increase in the ROW nominal 
money stock by  -  Ayl, will permit an instantaneous transi- 
tion to the new, real long-run equilibrium with lower values of c,  Id, 
and P,  avoiding the transitory inflation in  the United  States and the 
transitory contraction in the ROW that would otherwise occur. 
h(l -  E) 
Y 
X(l -  E) 
Y 149  Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World Economy 
4.5.2  A Demand-induced Slowdown in Economic Activity 
When the cause of a disappointing level of economic activity is a 
decline in some component of private demand, appropriately designed 
demand  management  can minimize the damage and, in  the present 
model, can be used to avoid it altogether. Increases in private liquidity 
preference (7,  and q2)  can be met with corresponding once-off increases 
in the levels of the nominal money stocks-m,  and m2. A downward 
shift in the private consumption functions or  a collapse of animal spirits 
can be offset directly by corresponding fiscal stimuli f,  and f2. If  the 
balanced-budget multiplier theorem retains some validity, these fiscal 
stimuli can be provided without increasing the deficit. Supply-side con- 
sequences from the tax increase or transfer-payments cuts involved in 
a balanced-budget expansion should of course be taken into account 
(the behavioral links, ignored here, between 
Note that it is never necessary, in response to any shock, to engineer 
a permanent change in monetary growth rates. Once-off changes in the 
levels of the nominal money stocks (or temporary changes in money 
growth rates) are sufficient. 
and Fi). 
4.6  Conclusion 
This chapter presents a rather old-fashioned study of demand man- 
agement in an open, interdependent economic system. Three contin- 
gencies discussed widely during 1984 and 1985 were analyzed using an 
eclectic, short-run Keynesian, long-run classical, two-country model. 
The main conclusion is that an active monetary and/or fiscal response 
in both countries or regions is in general required to minimize the costs 
associated  with  the adjustment  process resulting  from a variety  of 
demand-side or supply-side  shocks.  Only in  the case of a currency 
collapse resulting from the bursting of an exchange market speculative 
bubble did a no-response policy appear desirable. A unilateral  U.S. 
fiscal contraction will cause a temporary slowdown of world economic 
activity as well as a sudden drop in the nominal and real value of the 
dollar. Merely preventing  the nominal exchange rate from changing 
does not reduce the magnitude of the global recession or alter the long- 
run real adjustment that takes place, but it would redistribute the un- 
changed global unemployment and excess capacity burden towards the 
United States and away from the ROW.  A no-response policy would 
be appropriate if the initial situation were characterized not only by an 
undesirable U.S. fiscal-monetary policy mix resulting in a poor U.S. 
international  competitive position but also by global excess demand. 
An expansionary fiscal move in the ROW or a combined expansionary 
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achieve the desired traverse to a better level of U.S. competitiveness 
without a global slump. These monetary stimuli need not be permanent 
increases in the rate of money growth. Once-off credible open market 
purchases raising the levels of the nominal money stocks suffice. 
The proper  response to a  sudden drop in  the value of  the dollar 
depends crucially on the reason(s) for this drop. The bursting  of  a 
speculative bubble has no obvious monetary or fiscal policy implica- 
tion. Downward pressure on the value of the dollar resulting from a 
once-off fall in  U.S. liquidity preference calls for a matching once-off 
reduction  in  the U.S. nominal money stock. Direct currency substi- 
tution away from the dollar calls for open market sales in the United 
States and open market purchases in the ROW. The consequences of 
the emergence of  a real risk premium on the return from foreign in- 
vestment in the United States can be neutralized by a matching increase 
in the difference between the U.S. tax rate on interest income from 
the ROW and the ROW’S tax rate on interest income from the United 
States. Alternatively, one might accept the depreciation of the nominal 
and real U.S.  exchange rates but avoid the transitional  U.S. inflation 
and ROW contraction by expanding the money stock in the ROW and 
reducing it in the United States. 
The appropriate policy response to a slowdown in global economic 
activity depends on whether this slowdown reflects a deterioration of 
the supply side or deficient aggregate demand. To avoid the stagflation 
that would otherwise result from a global adverse supply shock, demand- 
reducing measures are called for in both countries. If the supply shock 
is temporary, the restrictive measures should be  reversed  when ca- 
pacity output recovers. The appropriate response to a fall in private 
demand for goods and services is a fiscal stimulus. The contractionary 
effects of  an increase in  liquidity preference can be  avoided  by  an 
accommodating (noninflationary) increase in  the level of the money 
stock. 
The fiscal stimuli discussed in this paper are to be interpreted as 
“discretionary”  changes over and above the automatic changes in tax 
receipts and transfer payments that reflect the workings of existing tax 
and benefit laws, rules, and regulations as the level of economic activity 
varies, and that may dampen but never eliminate such fluctuations. 
To  provide truly  satisfactory answers to the questions raised here 
the model would have to be extended in a number of directions. Even 
an analysis that focuses on the industrial world alone, would benefit 
from a three-region setting: the United States (plus Canada), Europe, 
and Japan. The complexity entailed in going to three regions virtually 
obliges one to use numerical rather than analytical methods. The model 
here  ignores  all  stock-flow asset dynamics,  those  coming from  the 
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of the balance of payments, and those resulting from real capital ac- 
cumulation.8 Again, their incorporation requires the use of numerical 
methods. Finally, it would be extremely desirable to allow explicitly 
for uncertainty. Adding some linear stochastic processes with known 
coefficients to the deterministic model is feasible but does not constitute 
much of an advance. Anything more complicated, even linear models 
with stochastic coefficients, let alone nonlinear stochastic models, means 
that we  enter the  mathematical  or computational stratosphere.  The 
modeling language we would like to use just does not exist yet. 
The logic of  the model used  here, and indeed of any model that 
permits persistent disequilibrium or non-Walrasian equilibrium, implies 
that monetary and fiscal policy instruments can be used actively  to 
stabilize output, employment, and the price level in response to a whole 
range of demand or supply shocks. To argue against such active policy 
responses, or against the adoption of explicit policy rules that would, 
for example, make monetary growth (or the deviation of actual mon- 
etary growth from its expected value) a function of observable contin- 
gencies, one would have to make a case for the technical, political, or 
institutional impossibility of an active stabilization policy. 
The technical impossibility of  stabilization policy has been argued 
on two grounds. There is the Lucas-Sargent-Wallace-Barro argument 
that in properly specified macroeconomic models only unperceived or 
unanticipated monetary policy can affect the deviations of actual real 
variables from their “natural” or full information values. Fiscal policy 
obviously has allocative effects both in the short run and in the long 
run, but it too cannot systematically affect the deviation of real output 
and employment from their capacity, full employment, or natural levels. 
If debt neutrality prevails, the substitution of lump-sum taxes for cur- 
rent borrowing has no real effects in the short run or in the long run. 
These policy ineffectiveness propositions for a while engaged the in- 
terest of a significant part of the macroeconomics profession but are 
now generally viewed as theoretical curiosa without empirical relevance. 
The second technical argument against the active use of stabilization 
policy is much older (it goes back at least to Milton Friedman’s work 
in the fifties and sixties) but more relevant. It is a generalization of the 
“long and variable lags” argument used by Friedman to make the case 
against active countercyclical use of monetary policy. Clearly, the length 
of the lag between the policy response and its impact on the variable(s) 
of  interest (the “outside”  lag) is irrelevant per se. It is uncertainty 
about the coefficients in the model, about the order of the lags, and 
indeed about the total specification of the appropriate  model of the 
economy that forces one to qualify the confident policy prescriptives 
that emerge from the manipulation of models such as the one advanced 
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of the need to respond and the moment the policy handle can finally 
be cranked, puts further constraints on our ability to stabilize the econ- 
omy through active demand management. Estimates of the “inside lag” 
for U.S.  fiscal policy range from a few years to infinity. 
It should be recognized that uncertainty about the way in which the 
economy works not only renders the consequences of policy activism 
harder to predict. It also increases uncertainty about the consequences 
of refraining from policy activism and sticking to preannounced, un- 
conditional (noncontingent or open-loop) rules. It seems highly unlikely 
that a cautious, safety-first policy of hedging one’s bets in the face of 
great uncertainty would ever involve the economic equivalent of lock- 
ing the steering wheel and closing one’s eyes. 
The political or institutional case against active demand management 
relies in  part on alleged observed asymmetries or irreversibilities  in 
monetary and fiscal policy design. Policymakers, according to this view, 
are happy to cut taxes and raise spending for cyclical reasons during 
a slump but are reluctant to raise taxes and cut spending when the 
economy is overheating and a countercyclical quid pro quo is needed. 
While there is some informal evidence supporting this view, there are 
counterexamples too (e.g., the increase in the overall British tax burden 
by 4%  of  GDP during Prime Minister Thatcher’s first term). It would 
be very valuable to have more systematic evidence on this important 
issue of political economy. 
The conditions under which optimal, conditional stabilization policy 
rules would be credible (or time-consistent) also are only just beginning 
to be studied. The study of post-World  War I1 economic history sug- 
gests that “stabilizing”  monetary and fiscal policy actions have their 
desired effects only if  the monetary or fiscal authorities have “con- 
servative”  reputations for underlying monetary soundness and fiscal 
responsibility and rectitude. Without such reputations, temporary and 
reversible changes in money growth, tax rates, or spending schedules 
are likely to be perceived as permanent. Such adverse expectations or 
confidence-effects may lead to inflation premiums in nominal interest 
rates, and even to “super-crowding  out” or negative multipliers as a 
result of increased long real rates (see Buiter [  1985b1).  The coordination 
of  international stabilization policies through international agencies with 
reputations for monetary and fiscal conservatism could therefore be 
especially effective. 
One set of “cautious”  global macroeconomic policy recommenda- 
tions  popular  among  international  officials (see, e.g.,  International 
Monetary Fund  [1985]) can be summarized as: (1) adherence to un- 
conditional medium-term monetary growth targets; (2) continued down- 
ward  pressure  on structural fiscal deficits; and  (3)  limited counter- 
cyclical responsiveness of actual deficits reflecting the (partial) operation 
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chapter, such a policy package will not prevent a global recession if 
and when the United States tightens its budgetary stance. It is not even 
sufficient to prevent the slowdown that appears to be underway already. 
The risks associated with this strategy are very high. Even in the current 
state of the art it  is not impossible to design a more flexible and a 
superior set of policy recommendations. Not for the first (or the last) 
time, caution demands, if  not action now, then certainly preparation 
for action should the need arise. 
Notes 
1. We  could specify the demand for real-money  balances as a demand for 
money balances in terms of the country’s consumption  bundle.  Let country 
1’s consumer price index PI be a weighted average of the domestic value-added 
deflator and the domestic currency value of the foreign value-added deflator, 
i.e. PI = alpl + (1 - al)(e + p2) 0 < a1  < 1. Money demand  is a function 
of  real income yl + pI -  PI = yl + (al - 1)c and the nominal interest rate, 
i.e., 
ml -  PI = kl  (YI  + PI -  PI) -  AA, or 
lI = klyl -  Alil + (kl - l)(al - 1)c. 
This equals our equation (1) when kl =  1 or  when a1  = 1. The superior al- 
terative specification results in slightly greater algebraic complexity. 
2. Adding this would not alter the results qualitatively.  Let the money de- 
mand  functions  including  direct  currency  substitution  be  given  by  ml - 
pI = pIe - Alil + klyl + ql  and m2 -  p2 = p2e - A2i2 + k2y2 + q2.  In the 
“symmetric”  case  considered  below,  PI = p2 = p;  Al = A2 = A  and 
.  It follows 
XI  + x2  k, = k2 = k. For any variable x let xd = xI -  x2  and xa  = - 
2 
that ld =  -(A  + 2p)id + kyd -  2p(~~  - T~)  and la  =  -hia  + w.  The be- 
havior of  “global averages”  is completely unaffected by direct currency sub- 
stitution. “Country differences”  are affected through an increased “interest- 
sensitivity”  of ld, i.e., the coefficient of  id now is  -(A  + 2p) instead of  -A. 
In addition, the last term on the r.h.s. of the ld equation is absent without direct 
currency substitution. If we ignore this second (minor) difference, the analysis 
that  follows can be  applied  to the case of  direct  currency substitution  by 
replacing A  (in the “differences”  model only) by A  + 2p. In the limiting case 
where the currencies are perfect substitutes (p = + m)  only an ex-ante fixed 
exchange rate regime is viable. 
3.  This result is quite robust and does not depend on the assumption of a 
fixed level of  capacity  output.  In Buiter (1984b) I consider the case where 
capacity output is given by a neoclassical production function with exogenous 
labor supply and a long-run endogenous capital stock. In the perfectly inte- 
grated financial markets, an increase in public spending raises the global real 
interest rate and thus lowers the steady-state capital stocks at home and abroad 
and with  them  domestic and foreign capacity  output.  If  the contraction  in 
capacity output is not biased toward the foreign country and if the increase in 
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raises the long-run relative price of home goods. If public debt is not neutral, 
a lower level of domestic taxes will  also (if domestic private spending is, at 
the margin, biased toward home goods) be associated with an increase in the 
relative price of home goods. 
4. For i'  to decline less on impact than in the long run, we must assume that 
1 - y+ - E > 0. For P  to decline less on impact than in the long run, we 
must asume that E < 1. 
5. Since KI + K2 = fl -  E. 
6. The statement is meant to apply only to a world without uncertainty. 
7. The behavior of Id and c given in equation (14a) can be summarized as 
[ ]  = A [r] + Bz, 
Eli- 
where A  = (au),  B = (bij),  and z is the vector of exogenous variables. 
The general solution for c and I can be shown to be (Buiter [1984a]) 
C(t) = -  W22-Iw2lld(l)  -  w22-1  ekz(f-T'DEp(T)dT  + Wz2-IF(t) 
[;;:;;:I  =  XI is the stable eigenvalue of A and X2 the unstable eigenvalue. 
W = V-1 where V  is the matrix whose columns are the right eigenvectors of 
A. D= [W2Ibl + Wzzbz].  [:;I  = B. F is the bubble  component.  It satisfies  E,&)  =h2F(t)  but  is 
otherwise arbitrary. 
8. For a numerical simulation model which incorporates all three sources of 
asset dynamics in a two-country, full-employment  setting, see Buiter (1984b). 
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nomic disturbances. The analytical framework is the celebrated two- 
country model of Mundell (1968, chap. 18), updated to include gradual 
price-level adjustment and rational expectations of the economy’s tran- 
sition path. Since its development more than two decades ago, Mun- 
dell’s model has proven to  be one of the most useful tools of descriptive, 
medium-term, macroeconomic  analysis. Buiter carefully notes  some 
important limitations of the model, for example, its failure to follow 
up the dynamic effects on public- and private-sector debt stocks of 
sustained international  shifts in  fiscal stance. The problem of  cumu- 
lating public debt lies at the heart of the current U.S. macroeconomic 
problem, and further analysis must recognize that policies designed to 
offset the  short-run effects of  shocks may  be  unsustainable over a 
longer horizon. 
If we leave these long-run issues aside, there is still the question of 
how best to use Mundell’s model as a tool of policy analysis rather 
than as a purely  descriptive framework. Buiter makes two key as- 
sumptions in  his analysis of optimal policy responses.  First, policy- 
makers are assumed to know quite precisely the nature of the disturb- 
ance to world equilibrium.  Second, there is an assumption that the 
effects of policy actions can be reliably predicted. Both these assump- 
tions are very strong, and ignore the uncertain environment in which 
actual policy decisions must be made. 
In the short term, policymakers  observe asset prices  such as ex- 
change rates on a daily basis, but they observe data on trade flows, 
industrial production, price levels, employment, and other variables 
with much less frequency. Preliminary estimates of these numbers can 
be unreliable; the United States government’s preliminary “flash” fore- 
casts of quarterly GNP have been so misleading recently that they have 
been discontinued. Policymakers are always in the position of inferring 
from available data the causes of economic changes. Does a particular 
exchange-rate movement reflect a disturbance in asset markets, in goods 
markets, or in both? As Buiter demonstrates, the appropriate policy 
response to the exchange-rate movement depends on the nature of the 
underlying shock. 
The second difficulty facing policymakers is uncertainty about how 
policies will  affect  the  economy.  Lucas’s  (1976) famous critique of 
econometric policy evaluation highlights the  practical  difficulties in 
forecasting the effects of  macroeconomic policies when private deci- 
sions are based on rational expectations.  In extreme cases, policies 
may become ineffective. I think Buiter goes too far in dismissing policy- 
ineffectiveness propositions as “theoretical curiosa without empirical 
relevance,” and I am unaware of an empirical basis for this dismissal. 
While it is implausible that the strongest of the policy-ineffectiveness 
results are literally applicable to reality, the results do warn us that 
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Uncertainty about the nature of shocks and the effects of policies 
places the policymaker in the type of world studied by Brainard (1967) 
and by Poole (1970). In that world, sophisticated fine-tuning of the sort 
Buiter analyzes is impossible, so authorities are likely to focus instead 
on some class of  simple policy rules, choosing the one that tends to 
yield the best macroeconomic outcomes on average. Here I want to 
discuss aspects of the comparison between two much-analyzed policy 
rules: a purely floating exchange rate and an exchange rate fixed by 
countries’ monetary authorities. The analytical literature on which my 
discussion builds is surveyed by Henderson (1984) and Marston (1985). 
My  1985 paper contains a more comprehensive comparative exami- 
nation of exchange-rate regimes. 
Small-Country Analysis and International Risk Sharing 
The first shock analyzed by Buiter, an unexpected fiscal tightening in 
the United States, illustrates a central proposition of the literature on 
fixed versus floating exchange rates: When most shocks to the economy 
represent aggregate demand movements (shifts in the IS curve), floating 
exchange rates minimize the conditional variance of output and thus serve 
as automatic stabilizers. In the presence of some form of wage-price 
inflexibility, an unforeseen decline in aggregate demand leads to a fall 
in employment. But if the exchange rate is flexible, the currency will 
adjust instantly, falling in value against foreign currencies and shifting 
world demand in favor of domestic products. Compared to a fixed ex- 
change rate, a floating rate results in a smaller decline in employment in 
the short run because it facilitates a rapid short-run change in relative 
prices. Under a fixed rate, home unemployment would persist until slowly 
adjusting home wages and prices had moved downward. 
As Mundell (1968) recognized, the foregoing argument in  favor of 
floating rates is primarily distributional. Under fixed rates an adverse 
aggregate demand shift results in a sharp fall in output. Under floating 
rates the output decline is dampened, but the deterioration in the terms 
of trade is sharper than with a fixed rate. When most shocks are to the 
goods market, the choice of exchange-rate system involves a short-run 
tradeoff between variability in employment and variability in the terms 
of trade. Because the incidence of  unemployment is presumably less 
even than that of an adverse terms-of-trade  shift, distributional con- 
siderations favor currency depreciation. 
If most disturbances to the economy originate in asset markets, how- 
ever, a fixed exchange rate minimizes the variance of output. Changes 
in money demand, for example, are accommodated entirely through 
the capital account under a fixed rate, and have no effect on output. 
A major shortcoming of these results is that they answer a question 
posed primarily in the context of a single small country whose choice 
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economic performance. But Buiter’s analysis of a U.S. fiscal contrac- 
tion makes clear why the small country’s decision problem may be the 
wrong problem to analyze in a framework that recognizes international 
policy interactions. The dollar’s depreciation softens the effect of  the 
blow to U.S.  output and employment. But at the same time the cor- 
responding appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar wors- 
ens the situation abroad compared to the fixed exchange rate case. By 
allowing the U.S. to export some of its unemployment, the dollar’s 
depreciation has a beggar-thy-neighbor effect. The U.S. decision on 
an exchange-rate regime will clearly affect foreign economies, and it 
is not clear that what is best for America will be best for the rest of 
the world. To discuss the “best”  exchange-rate system for the world 
economy, we must reformulate our notion of how a good exchange- 
rate system performs. 
In my  1985 paper I suggest that a global perspective on exchange- 
rate regime choice must recognize that different exchange-rate systems 
have different implications for the allocation of macroeconomic risks 
among the participating countries.  In the example discussed above, 
dollar depreciation shields the U.S. economy from an adverse IS shift 
but has the opposite effect on U.S. trading partners. In compensation, 
when IS shifts occur abroad, floating dollar rates allow foreign countries 
to export some of their own macro instability to the United  States. 
There is a suggestive analogy to markets for insurance. The beggar- 
thy-neighbor  effect  of a dollar depreciation can be  thought  of  as a 
“payment”  made by the foreign country to the United States in states 
of  the world where U.S.  aggregate demand is relatively low. In the 
opposite situation, the United States, by allowing its currency to ap- 
preciate, compensates foreign countries.  It is conceivable that both 
countries can simultaneously reduce output variability by sharing mac- 
roeconomic risks through a floating exchange rate. 
In the balance of this discussion, I will therefore concentrate on the 
following question: Are there conditions under which all countries can 
simultaneously  improve  their  average  macroeconomic  performance 
through the adoption of  a particular exchange-rate system? Using an 
illustrative model, I will show that such conditions can be found, and 
that they result in criteria of regime choice similar to those that govern 
an individual country’s decision. As in many similar contexts, the im- 
plementation of Pareto-improving risk-sharing arrangements may en- 
counter problems of  moral hazard and enforcement. These problems 
are of central importance to our understanding of how actual exchange- 
rate systems work, but to illustrate the exchange rate’s potential role 
in risk allocation among countries, I will simply assume that individual 
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A Simple Model 
To  illustrate results,  I use a  log-linear version  of  Mundell's  two- 
country model. Even as a medium-term framework, this model is se- 
verely limited in its omission of dynamics and expectations. Further, 
it makes no allowance for the important possibility that the choice of 
an exchange-rate system may  itself lead to changes in  institutional 
aspects of the economy. Nonetheless, the model is useful as an intuition- 
building device, and as a first step toward more complex analyses. 
Like Buiter, I work with a model in which equation parameters are 
identical across countries. Under a floating exchange rate, the model 
is described by the equations: 
y  = 6e - Oi  + u (home output determination), 
y* = -6e  - 8i* + u* (foreign output determination), 
m = +y - hi (home money-market equilibrium), 
m* = +y*  - hi'  (foreign money-market equilibrium), 
i = i* (perfect international asset substitution). 
Above, variables have the same meaning as in the Buiter model, except 
that m and m'  are interpreted as random variables reflecting shocks to 
money supply net of shocks to money demand. The variances of these 
two monetary disturbances are denoted uh and uh*,  respectively, and 
their covariance is urn,+  The random variables u and U*  are shocks to 
the aggregate demand functions. The relevant characteristics of their 
joint distribution are summarized by the variances a:  and u$ and the 
covariance uuu*.  The model reflects the Mundell assumptions of static 
expectations and rigid nominal output prices, fixed at p  = p* = 0. For 
simplicity, I have also ignored direct spillover effects from one coun- 
try's  output to the other's aggregate demand. 
Define 
= e+/(A  + e+) < 1. 
Then the floating-rate output levels in the two countries are 
(1)  Y(FLOAT = [(I  -  q)(u + u') 
+ (1 + 71) (ml4) -  (1 - qh*/+)1/2, 
+ (1  + q)W+) -  (1 -  q)(m/+)l/2. 
(2)  Y*~FLOAT  = [(I  -  V)(U  + u') 
Different fixed exchange rate models result from different assump- 
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To be concrete, I will analyze a “dollar standard” (see my 1985 paper), 
a system also discussed by Buiter as the t‘non-McKinnon variant” of 
a fixed-rate regime. In this system, the foreign central bank intervenes 
to peg the exchange rate, holding its foreign reserves in the form of 
interest-bearing home-currency claims on the home treasury or private 
sector. Official settlements balances  affect the foreign money supply 
but not the home money supply. The model’s equations are 
y  = Sef  -  Oi + u (home output determination), 
y*  =  -Sef  - 07  + u* (foreign output determination), 
m = +y  -  Xi (home money-market equilibrium), 
i = i*  (perfect international asset substitution), 
where efis the fixed level of the exchange rate. 
Because m is not endogenous, the four equations above determine 
the four unknowns y,  y*, i,  and i*. The foreign money supply, m*,  is 
determined recursively by y*, i, and the resulting demand for money 
in the foreign country. 
(3) 
Output levels under a fixed exchange rate are 
YIF~X  = (1 -  q)u + (1 -  q)Sef + qW+), 
(4)  y*JFIX  = u* -  qu -  (I + q) Sef + q(m/+). 
World output depends only on the reserve country’s monetary condi- 
tions and on the aggregate-demand  shocks u and u*. The latter dis- 
turbance does not influence home output in this model because I have 
assumed away any direct spillover effect from foreign output to home 
demand. 
In each country, policymakers  are concerned with minimizing the 
conditional variance of output. Equations (1)  through  (4)  imply that 
output variances are complicated  functions of  the variances of  the 
underlying real and monetary shocks and these shocks’ covariances. 
To illustrate how the joint distribution  of  shocks determines policy- 
makers’ preferences over exchange-rate regimes, I follow a practice 
common in the literature and look at two extreme cases, the case in 
which all shocks are real and the case in which all shocks are monetary. 
Real Disturbances 
Small-country analysis typically yields the result that when all dis- 
turbances are real (that is, shifts in u or u”),  a floating-rate regime is 
preferred. In a two-country setting, we need to ask whether the absence 
of monetary shocks implies that both countries gain from a float, in 
the sense that the variances of their outputs are lower than under a 
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Assume that monetary conditions are nonstochastic. Equations (1) 
and (2) imply that output variances under a floating exchange rate are 
u?IFLOAT  = (1 - q)2(uf + u:*  + 2uUu*)/4, 
+IFLOAT  = (1 -  q)2(uZ + u:*  + 2~,,*)/4. 
Under a fixed rate, the corresponding variances, implied by (3)and (4), 
are 
u?(FIX = (1 -  $’u;  9 
U?.lFIX = a;* + q2u;  - 2quuu*. 
A first implication of these formulas is that policymakers in the two 
countries may prefer different exchange-rate regimes; it is therefore 
possible that exchange-rate regimes can not be unambiguously ranked 
in  terms of the Pareto criterion. Imagine, for example, that uuu*  = 0 
and that u$ is much higher than u:.  In this case the home country may 
lose by importing macroeconomic stability from abroad through a float- 
ing exchange rate; it would prefer a fixed rate that insulates it com- 
pletely from foreign aggregate-demand shocks. For the same reason, 
foreign policymakers would prefer a floating rate. A floating rate allows 
them to export some of their severe macroeconomic instability to the 
home country while importing relatively little instability from the home 
country in return. 
To  obtain clear-cut results, it is useful to impose an additional sym- 
metry condition on the model, the condition that 
u:*  = a:. 
Under this additional assumption, the variability disadvantage of a fixed 
rate for the home country is 
u?lFIx -  $IFLOAT  = (1 - q12d(1 -  pUu*)/2, 
where  puu.  is the coefficient of correlation between u and u*. Notice 
that the above difference is positive unless u and u* are perfectly  cor- 
related.  Short of  such perfect correlation, therefore, a floating rate, 
compared to a fixed rate, lowers the variance of the home country’s 
output. 
For the foreign country, the corresponding variability difference is 
u?*IFix -  +IFLOAT  = (1  + q)’&(1  - p,,*)/2. 
This difference is a strictly positive number if  p,,.  < 1. Thus, the for- 
eign country also gains by moving to a floating exchange rate under 
the conditions assumed in this section. 
The intuition behind these results is that sketched above. Provided 
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a floating rate enables each country to avoid more effectively some of 
the output risk posed by its own demand disturbance. Each country 
must also increase its exposure to demand shocks that occur abroad. 
But both countries can gain from this trade of risks when the average 
magnitudes of home and foreign shocks are similar; and the extent of 
gains from trade is greater the more highly negative is the correlation 
between the two countries’ demand shocks. This result is the global 
extension of the proposition  that a small country gains from floating 
when economic  fluctuations  are mostly due to shifts in aggregate demand. 
Monetary Disturbances 
Turn next to the second extreme case, that in which all disturbances 
are monetary (that is, shifts in m or m*).  Small-country analysis indi- 
cates that fixed rates are preferable when monetary shocks dominate. 
Can this result, too, be extended to a global setting? 
Equations (1) and (2) imply that when all shocks are monetary, output 
variances under floating are given by 
u;IFLOAT  = [(I  + $2uf  + (I - q)’~j$*  -  2(1 - $)~,,*]/4$~, 
+IFLOAT  = [(I  +  + (I -  ~)2~f  - 2(1 - q2)~,,*]/4+2. 
Equations (3) and (4) lead to the corresponding fixed-rate variances 
$lFlX  = (d$)2u$? 
$*IFIX  = (q/$)2uf* 
For the home country, the variability disadvantage of a floating rate 
is 
u?:IFLOAT - u;:Imx 
= [(l  + 27 - 3q2)uf  + (I -  q)2uf* -  2(1 -  q2)um,*l/4$2. 
Because q < 1, this difference  is always positive (so that the home 
country prefers a fixed rate) when the correlation between m and m* 
is negative. Under the symmetry assumption 
a$* = u$, 
u$lFLOAT -  u;(FIx  = (1 - q2)uf(l -  pmm*)W2, 
the variance difference above becomes 
where  pmm* is the coefficient of correlation between m and m’.  This 
difference is strictly positive if  pmm* < 1. So if monetary shocks are of 
similar average magnitude across countries and imperfectly correlated, 
home policymakers will prefer a fixed exchange rate. 
Foreign policymakers also prefer to peg under these conditions. In 
general, 163  Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World Economy 
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= [(l - 2q - 3q2)a; 
+ (1 + q)’aL* - 2(1 -  q2)am,*1/4+2. 
Notice that if  1 -  2q - 3q2 < 0 and u& is large relative to a&*,  the 
foreign country may well prefer to float its currency to avoid importing 
too much monetary instability from abroad. But if the variances of the 
monetary shocks are equal, 
+JFLOAT  - a:*lpix  = (1 - q2)a&(l - ~,,*)/2+~, 
a strictly positive number when pmm. < 1. 
When monetary shocks dominate and are of  similar average mag- 
nitude across countries, fixed exchange rates produce the better inter- 
national allocation of  macroeconomic risk. Once again, the gains from 
trading macroeconomic risk through fixing rather than floating are greater 
the more highly negative is pmm.. These findings generalize, to a global 
setting, the usual small-country result. 
Some Qualifications 
My discussion has so far been based on the assumption that, all else 
being equal, policymakers prefer an exchange-rate regime that dampens 
fluctuations in output. The justification for this assumption is largely 
distributional:  the incidence of  a change in real income caused by a 
terms-of-trade movement is presumably more even than that of a real- 
income change taking the form of a change in output and employment. 
The models analyzed here and in Buiter’s discussion, however, as- 
sume that each country is specialized in producing a single homoge- 
neous good. This simplification obscures some important distributional 
problems that a floating rate can cause even when nonmonetary shocks 
are dominant. Aggregate-demand disturbances need  not fall propor- 
tionally on all of the economy’s products; so while the exchange-rate’s 
response will cushion overall output, it may worsen the employment 
imbalance in some sectors compared to the outcome under a fixed rate. 
At  several points,  Buiter  describes  the  sectoral implications  of  the 
shocks he considers. 
Like risk pooling between countries, risk pooling within countries is 
limited, so any aggregate benefits of a floating exchange rate may be 
unevenly distributed. Therefore, when real disturbances to the econ- 
omy are transitory, there is a case for resisting the exchange-rate changes 
that would otherwise occur. In these circumstances, a fixed exchange 
rate reduces relocation costs that might be needlessly incurred as fac- 
tors move between  sectors.  Pegging may  also help  reduce political 
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There is no case, however, for pegging in  the face of a permanent 
real disturbance. Monetary intervention cannot prevent eventual ad- 
justment on the real side of the economy. Defending a fixed exchange 
rate despite a permanent structural shock would only weaken macro- 
economic performance while failing to eliminate relocation costs or 
protectionist pressures. 
The case for fixing the exchange rate in response to temporary goods- 
market disturbances requires an additional premise. Either firms and 
individuals must be unable to borrow to “ride out” temporary negative 
shocks, or the market must be unable to distinguish short-lived from 
long-lived disturbances. Both of these problems arise in practice; and 
they  leave the government with the job of distinguishing permanent 
from transitory shocks. It is hard to believe that the government can 
make this distinction more reliably than the private sector. 
References 
Brainard, William C. 1967. Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy. Amer- 
ican Economic Review 57 (May): 41 1-25. 
Henderson, Dale W.  1984. Exchange market intervention  operations: Their 
role in financial policy and their effects. In Exchange rate theory andpractice, 
ed. John F.  0. Bilson and Richard C. Marston. Chicago: University of Chi- 
cago Press (for the National Bureau of Economic Research). 
Lucas, Robert E., Jr.  1976. Econometric policy evaluation: A critique. In The 
Phillips  curve and labor markets, ed. Karl Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer. 
Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on  Public Policy, a supplement to the 
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.  I:  19-46. 
Marston, Richard C. 1985. Stabilization policies in open economies. In Hand- 
book of international economics, vol. 2, ed. Ronald W.  Jones and Peter B. 
Kenen. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Mundell, Robert A.  1968. International economics. New York: Macmillan. 
Obstfeld, Maurice.  1985. Floating exchange rates: Experience and prospects. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity  16, no.  2: 369-450. 
Poole, William.  1970.  Optimal  choice of  monetary policy  instruments in  a 
simple stochastic macro model. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (May): 
1 97 -2 1  6. 
Comment  Stephen J. Turnovsky 
The three questions motivating Willem Buiter’s discussion are all im- 
portant and highlight the growing interdependence between Western 
economies. Buiter presents a careful analysis of these issues within the 
Stephen J. Turnovsky is professor of economics at the University of Illinois at Urbana- 
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framework of a two-country Dornbusch model. The basic structure of 
this model is by now standard. Specifically, two key features are: con- 
tinuous equilibrium in the money market (the exchange rate being a 
“jump”  variable);  disequilibrium in  the goods market (prices being 
“sluggish”).  This model has served the profession  well for almost a 
decade now, in analyzing various macroshocks. I am not sure, however, 
that as it stands the model is the optimal vehicle for addressing all of 
the issues raised in this paper. 
I shall structure my remarks about several issues: the specifics of 
the model; future anticipated shocks; strategic aspects; an alternative 
optimizing model. 
The Model 
As noted, the model is in the Dornbusch tradition and I have little 
to say about its specification. Like most of the current work being done 
on two-country models,  Buiter’s discussion assumes the two econ- 
omies to be symmetric. This is convenient and not an unreasonable 
first approximation, since there is no a priori reason for, say, the United 
States and Europe to differ in terms of their aggregate behavior in any 
systematic way. The assumption has the enormous advantage of allow- 
ing one to exploit Aoki’s (1981) technique of the representation of the 
dynamics in terms of sums and differences of the underlying variables. 
In the present context, this causes the dynamics of  the third-order 
system to decompose into two subsystems involving: average variables, 
which follow a stable first-order adjustment; differences and the ex- 
change rate, which follow a second-order system, having a saddlepoint. 
Not only does this decomposition increase the tractability of the anal- 
ysis,  but  it  also  helps  provide  economic  insight  into  the  dynamic 
adjustments. 
A key feature of the model is that the exchange rate responds only 
to differences in the variables and that averages are independent of the 
exchange rate.  An important consequence is that averages are inde- 
pendent of  anticipation  of future shocks. They respond only to the 
actual shocks, when they occur. The reason for this is simply that all 
anticipations of future disturbances impact on the present state of the 
two economies through the current exchange rate. But this does not 
affect the averages. For the same reason, anticipated future worldwide 
shocks, which leave differences and therefore the exchange rate un- 
changed, also have no effect on the economies until the anticipated 
changes actually take place. 
I would like to comment on one specific assumption, which has a 
more critical bearing on the behavior  of  the model than is perhaps 
suggested by Buiter. This concerns the deflation of money balances by 
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living, PI.  As Buiter  notes (n.l), the more desirable specification of 
monetary equilibrium is (for country  1, say) 
ml -  PI = klb, + pI -  PJ - Alil, 
or equivalently, 
I, - (1 - al)(l - kl)c = klyl - Alil. 
If either a,  = 1 or k, = 1,  this reduces to the equation in the text. If 
not, there is a relative price effect in the money market, through c, 
and this gives rise to differences in behavior. While one does not want 
to quibble over details of specification, in this case the differences in 
behavior  are  of  sufficient  qualitative  significance  to merit  further 
discussion. 
First, the result of section 4.3.1,  that a U.S. fiscal tightening without 
fiscal or monetary response in the ROW and without monetary response 
in the U.S.  leads to an instantaneous long-run adjustment in the ex- 
change rate, does not hold with this alternative specification. In general, 
it can be shown that we can specify the stable locus in  fd -  e space 
by a positively sloped linear equation of the form 
(1)  e - t = +(P - id) 
where tildes denote steady states and + > 0. Differentiating this equa- 
tion at time 0, with respect to the domestic fiscal instrument fl, and 
recognizing that because of sluggish prices, fI,  f,,  and hence ld is pre- 
determined, yields 
de(0)  dk  did 
4-1  41  - -+df, 
If we take 0 < at < 1, it can be shown that 
-  5 0 according to whether kl I  1  (3) 
Under the assumption considered by Buiter, did/dfl = 0, and hence 
de(0)/dfl  = dddf,,  implying complete instantaneous adjustment of  the 
exchange rate. If  kl < 1, then did/df, < 0, so that on impact 
did 
df  1 
de(0)  dt  O>-  >- 
41  &-I 
and we get only partial adjustment to the domestic fiscal contraction. 
On the other hand, if  k, > 1, then did/dfl  >O,  so 
dt  de(0)  0>->- 
dfl  dfl 
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Second, under the alternative monetary specification, the domestic 
fiscal contraction does not in general cause equal recessions in the U.S. 
and abroad, in  contrast to Buiter’s case. The reason is that the fiscal 
contraction leads to a depreciation of  the domestic currency in  both 
nomimal and real terms.  This means  that c rises to that if  kl < 1, 
I, -  (1 -  q)(l -  k,)c falls. This puts a squeeze on domestic real- 
money balances, thereby accentuating the recession in the domestic 
economy. By  the same token, real-money balances abroad increase, 
thereby moderating the recession and, indeed, it is even possible for 
foreign output to rise. If k, > 1, these relative price effects are reversed. 
A third result, that a domestic fiscal contraction matched by a foreign 
fiscal expression enables the improvement in  U.S. competitiveness to 
be  achieved without a contraction in  output in  either country, also 
depends upon  the chosen form of  monetary specification. With the 
alternative specification, we  can easily show that while this matched 
policy  will  leave total world  output unchanged, outputs in  the two 
countries will be  affected in exactly offsetting ways; the specific re- 
sponses will depend upon whether kl 5 1. 
By contrast, the result that employment and output can be maintained 
in  response to a domestic fiscal contraction, by  the appropriate bal- 
anced increases in the respective money stocks of the two economies, 
remains true. Again, the relative adjustments in the two economies 
depends upon whether k, 9 1. 
The difference between these last two results is due to the familiar 
relationship between instruments and targets. Buiter’s discussion fo- 
cuses (implicitly) on two objectives, the stabilization of domestic and 
foreign output levels in the face of a domestic fiscal contraction. In 
general, the foreign fiscal instrument alone cannot stabilize both outputs 
simultaneously at their respective target levels. On the other hand, the 
two output objectives can be achieved by the appropriate choice of the 
two monetary instruments. 
I now  wish to comment on the application of  the analysis to the 
“collapsing” U.S. dollar. I am not sure that the analysis is appropriate 
for this, but perhaps my  reservation is really in  part a semantic one. 
The analysis deals with  two aspects: the bursting bubble; shifts in 
various kinds. 
Buiter considers a situation in  which the economy is following an 
unstable path (a bubble path), which, if pursued forever, will eventually 
lead to an infinitely overvalued dollar. At  some point, to, the market 
recognizes the nature of the bubble path, at which time the exchange 
rate jumps onto the appropriate stable locus (in this case, straight to 
the new equilibrium point). While this may characterize a bursting of 
the bubble, to my mind it does not describe a “collapse” of the dollar. 
Rather, it represents a rea!ignment of the currency which needs to take 
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increased but that the exchange rate did not undertake the necessary 
jump immediately at the time the monetary increase occurred. It is 
clear that the increase in real-money balances will lower the domestic 
interest  rate,  which,  given interest-rate  parity,  causes  a  continuous 
appreciation of the domestic currency. This adjustment is perverse and 
the jump in the exchange rate-the  bursting of the bubble-is  needed 
to get the exchange rate back on track. 
The second aspect Buiter considers is the effects of various shifts in 
the underlying structural relationships which give rise to a depreciation 
of the dollar. These all strike me as being very gentle and do not capture 
the notion of a collapse. Indeed, I am unclear about how, precisely, 
one can have a collapse of a currency in a perfectly flexible exchange 
rate regime. The idea of a collapsing currency implies a regime which 
is no longer sustainable. I think that the kind of analysis first undertaken 
by  Flood and Garber (1984), in which pressures are brought to bear 
on the exchange rate, bringing about an eventual breakdown of  the 
regime, may be more appropriate for addressing this issue. 
Finally, the slowdown of economic activity is also captured by shifts. 
Here, Buiter distinguishes between  shifts on the supply side (y,,  L2) 
and on the demand side (fl,  ql).  Since the model is dynamic, it would 
seem more appropriate to capture the notion of a slowdown in terms 
of a reduction in some underlying growth rate, rather than in terms of 
once-and-for-all shifts. It should be reasonably straightforward to ex- 
tend the model to accommodate this. 
Anticipations Effects 
The shocks in the model are all unanticipated. Models of this struc- 
ture lend themselves to the analysis of anticipated future shocks on 
the current  state of  the economy-so-called  announcement  effects. 
These analyses have become standard in rational-expectations models, 
particularly in the analysis of monetary policy, which has received most 
of the attention in the literature. While such exercises can always be 
justified in terms of their intrinsic interest, one can argue that expec- 
tational effects are of  much more practical  relevance in the present 
context, where the primary focus is on fiscal policy. Cuts in government 
expenditure programs require legislation and these can take years to 
be enacted. Yet  it is clear, for example, from discussions surrounding 
current proposals to cut the deficit, that anticipations of their ultimate 
introduction will have significant immediate effects on the economy. 
Under the assumption of symmetry introduced by Buiter, anticipa- 
tions effects impinge on the economy in a particularly simple way. By 
operating through the exchange rate, they have no effects on the av- 
erage variables, as I noted earlier. This means that following an an- 
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domestic and foreign economies move in precisely offsetting ways. For 
example, suppose that at time 0, the fiscal authorities in country  I 
announce a fiscal contraction to take effect at time T. The time paths 
for yI,  y2,  the outputs in the two economies, are as illustrated in figure 
4.9 where for convenience the equilibrium levels are set at zero. 
The anticipation of the future fiscal contraction leads to an immediate 
depreciation of the domestic currency (appreciation of the foreign cur- 
rency). With sluggish output prices, this leads to a real depreciation of 
the domestic currency, causing the demand for domestic output, and 
hence domestic output itself, to increase. This increase in activity causes 
the price of  domestic output to begin rising. The domestic currency 
continues to depreciate following the announcement. This further in- 
creases the demand for the domestic good, thereby continuing to in- 
crease domestic output and the domestic rate of inflation. 
This pattern continues until time T, when the anticipated contraction 
occurs. This reduces  domestic output to a level below its long-run 
equilibrium. The short-run inflation is reversed and the price of do- 
mestic output starts to fall. This in turn means that the real stock of 
domestic money starts to rise, thereby providing an offsetting expan- 
sionary effect to output, which then gradually rises back to its equilib- 
rium level. As this occurs, the deflation is moderated and the price of 




Fig. 4.9  Time paths for output in response to  announced domestic 
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We  now turn to the foreign economy. As already noted, the aggregate 
world economy remains stationary until time  T, when the fiscal con- 
traction actually takes place. During the period 0 < t 5 T, the averages 
of  the domestic and foreign variables all remain fixed at their initial 
equilibrium levels. Since all adjustments during this phase stem directly 
from the initial announcement and the jump in the exchange rate this 
generates, it follows that, given the symmetry of the two economies, 
the adjustment in the rest of the world is a mirror image of that in the 
domestic economy. 
Thus during the period following the announcement, but prior to the 
fiscal contraction, the initial rise in domestic output, together with the 
subsequent continuous rise, is matched by an equivalent initial decrease 
and continued fall abroad, stemming from the appreciation of the for- 
eign currency. The falling foreign output causes the price of foreign 
output to begin falling at an increasing rate. At the time of  the fiscal 
contraction, the decrease in domestic activity generates some negative 
spillover effects onto demand and output in the foreign economy. Out- 
put abroad therefore undergoes a modest decrease at time T, decreasing 
the foreign rate of inflation at that time. The falling foreign price level 
causes the relative price of foreign goods to decrease, causing foreign 
output to begin rising. 
The interesting point to observe from this figure is that, in the short 
run, the announcement of  the domestic fiscal contraction has a stim- 
ulating effect domestically but generates a recession abroad. And al- 
though after the implementation of the contraction, the domestic econ- 
omy is more adversely affected than is the foreign economy, it is quite 
likely that the accumulated output losses resulting from the domestic 
fiscal contraction will be greater abroad than in the domestic economy. 
The appropriate policy responses  which  the foreign economy might 
undertake to mitigate these adverse effects is an interesting issue, sim- 
ilar to those discussed by Buiter. 
Strategic Aspects 
Buiter deals with policy responses to various disturbances. Much of 
the discussion has tended to focus on, if  only implicitly, output stabi- 
lization as being the objective. With more than one target in the poli- 
cymaker’s objective, and with fewer policy instruments available than 
targets, the international stabilization problem introduces questions of 
strategic behavior. These have been getting increasing attention; see, 
e.g.,  Hamada (1976), Canzoneri and Gray (1985), and the papers in 
Buiter and Marston (1985). 
The emphasis in much of this literature has been on the appropriate 
strategic responses to demand and supply shocks. Most of this dis- 
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where the objective is to stabilize some objective, typically specified 
as a quadratic loss function in terms of output and price stability. This 
literature is very closely related to the present analysis and it is there- 
fore of interest to summarize some of the findings; see, e.g., Turnovsky 
and d’Orey (1986). 
1. A negative demand shock in one country (corresponding to a fiscal 
contraction in  that  country) calls for a monetary expansion in both 
countries. The relative amounts by which the adjustments should be 
borne depends upon the strategic equilibrium. 
2. A negative supply shock in one country (corresponding to a re- 
duction in activity in that country) calls for a monetary expansion in 
that country and probably a monetary contraction abroad. 
3. From a welfare point of view, demand shocks are typically less 
problematical than supply disturbances. Country-specific demand dis- 
turbances of a given magnitude give rise to smaller aggregate welfare 
costs than do supply disturbances of equal magnitude. 
4. The welfare costs of a country-specific demand disturbance (for 
two symmetric economies) are borne equally by the two countries. The 
welfare costs of  a country-specific  supply disturbance, on the other 
hand, are borne primarily by the country in which they occur. 
5. The gains from cooperation are relatively small. They are, how- 
ever, somewhat larger for supply shocks. 
Buiter’s paper discusses the monetary and fiscal policy responses as 
alternatives to stabilizing for the various disturbances. This raises an 
important issue. Most of the existing work on strategic policymaking 
deals with monetary policy. But an important result in game theory is 
that in general, even under certainty, the choice of  instruments by the 
agents is important and will affect the equilibrium outcome. This is in 
contrast to optimal policymaking by a single agent, where under cer- 
tainty  such a choice is unimportant. The reason for the difference is 
that the policymakers’ reaction-functions, which condition the optimi- 
zation of each of the agents, depend upon the choice of policy instru- 
ment. Thus the choice of monetary or fiscal policy is not a matter of 
indifference in a (deterministic) strategic environment. Which is better? 
What if  one country uses a fiscal instrument, while the other uses a 
monetary instrument? Does indeed  an equilibrium strategy exist in 
these cases? These are some of the issues that are raised. 
Optimizing Models 
Without doubt, the Dornbusch framework is a very tractable and 
attractive one. But it does suffer from one serious limitation. Because 
it is an ad hoc model, it does not introduce welfare considerations in 
any explicit way. Yet welfare considerations are presumably what should 
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In response to the limitations of ad hoc models, there is a growing 
trend to ensure that macromodels are based on some kind of underlying 
private-agent optimization. The extent to which this removes the ar- 
bitrariness of macroeconomic models is questionable, since the nature 
of  the objective function and the precise constraints confronting the 
agents are themselves arbitrary. 
In the area of  international macroeconomics, the development of 
optimization models has been restricted to small open economies. Here 
a further difficulty is encountered. If one adopts the usual assumptions 
of  uncovered  interest parity and a constant rate of  time discount,  p 
say, for a steady-state equilibrium to exist, these models require that 
we choose p = r*, the exogenously given foreign real interest rate. 
Although this restriction is not unreasonable, it typically means that 
the only sustainable equilibrium is the steady state. In other words, 
the economy must always be in steady-state equilibrium, thereby im- 
plying instantaneous adjustment to all exogenous shocks. This elimi- 
nation of all transitional dynamics is obviously a severe shortcoming. 
There are ways of restoring the transitional dynamics, such as endo- 
genizing the discount rate, but these are somewhat arbitrary. 
In a two-country world, this last limitation does not occur. While in 
steady state, the equality of the world real-interest rate and the rate of 
time discount must hold, in the short run these rates may diverge. This 
permits the system to be out of steady-state equilibrium and allows for 
transitional dynamics. Such a framework provides an interesting line 
for further research into the kinds of  issues analyzed by  Buiter. It has 
the important advantage of providing a natural criterion for evaluating 
the welfare consequences of the various disturbances and the appro- 
priate policy responses. 
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